Research on Systems-of-Systems Acquisition by Rendon, Rene G. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2010
Research on Systems-of-Systems Acquisition
Rendon, Rene G.; Huynh, Thomas V.; Osmundson, John S.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/55295
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.







Approved for public release, distribution unlimited. 
 










Creating Synergy for Informed Change
May 12 - 13, 2010 
 



























The research presented at the symposium was supported by the Acquisition Chair of the 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
 
To request Defense Acquisition Research or to become a research sponsor, please 
contact: 
 
NPS Acquisition Research Program 
Attn: James B. Greene, RADM, USN, (Ret.)  
Acquisition Chair 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road, Room 332 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
Tel: (831) 656-2092 
Fax: (831) 656-2253 
E-mail: jbgreene@nps.edu  
 







Research on Systems-of-Systems Acquisition  
Rene Rendon—Rene G. Rendon is an associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
where he teaches defense acquisition courses.  He served for over twenty years as a contracting 
officer in the USAF, retiring at the rank of lieutenant colonel.  His career included assignments as a 
contracting officer for the Peacekeeper ICBM, Maverick Missile, and the F-22 Raptor.  He was also 
the director of contracting for the Space Based Infrared satellite program and the Evolved 
Expendable Launch Vehicle rocket program.  Rendon has published in the Journal of Public 
Procurement, the Journal of Contract Management, and the Project Management Journal.   
Rene G. Rendon 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
rgrendon@nps.edu 
Thomas V. Huynh—Thomas V. Huynh obtained simultaneously a BS in Chemical Engineering and 
a BA in Applied Mathematics from UC Berkeley and an MS and a PhD in Physics from UCLA. He is 
an associate professor of systems engineering at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. 
His research interests include uncertainty management in systems engineering, complex systems 
and complexity theory, system scaling, and system-of-systems engineering methodology.  Prior to 
joining the Naval Postgraduate School in 2003, he was a Fellow at the Lockheed Martin Advanced 
Technology Center in Palo Alto and Sunnyvale, CA, where he engaged in research in computer 
network performance, computer timing control, bandwidth allocation, heuristic algorithms, nonlinear 
estimation, perturbation theory, differential equations, and optimization. While he spent 23 years in 
the aerospace industry, he was also teaching part-time in the departments of Physics and 
Mathematics at San Jose State University.  Dr. Huynh is a member of INCOSE. 
Thomas V. Huynh 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943 
thuynh@nps.edu 
John S. Osmundson—John S. Osmundson received a BS in physics from Stanford 
University and a PhD in physics from the University of Maryland.  He is an associate 
research professor with a joint appointment in the Systems Engineering and 
Information Sciences Departments at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. 
His research interest is applying systems engineering and computer modeling and 
simulation methodologies to the development of systems-of-systems architectures, 
performance models, and system trades of time-critical information systems. Prior to 
joining the Naval Postgraduate School in 1995, Dr. Osmundson worked for 23 years at 
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (now Lockheed Martin Space Division) in 
Sunnyvale and Palo Alto, CA, as a systems engineer, systems engineering manager, 
and manager of advanced studies. Dr. Osmundson is a member of INCOSE. 
John S. Osmundson 
Naval Postgraduate School 









Acquisition of a system-of-systems can be an all new acquisition of multiple systems 
that are intended to operate together as a system-of-systems.  Much more common in the 
DoD is acquisition of one or more new systems that are intended to interoperate with 
existing systems as a system-of-systems with new capabilities.  In either case, successful 
acquisition of systems-of-systems (SoS) necessarily depends on effective contracting 
structures and processes for systems-of-systems acquisition.  In this paper, a set of system-
of-systems issues that needs to be addressed in SoS acquisition is identified and the current 
findings in this on-going research are discussed.  The findings suggest sustainment of 
extensive systems engineering efforts within the SoS acquisition and change to the existing 
contracting structures and process and organizational structures to maximize the probability 
of SoS acquisition success.  The resulting changes will be applied to current and future DoD 
SoS acquisitions. 
Introduction 
No universal agreement on a definition of the term “system-of-systems” exists, but 
many definitions have common basic elements. Sage and Cuppan (2001) describe a 
system-of-systems (SoS) as having operational and managerial independence of the 
individual systems as well as of emergent behavior.  Maier and Rechtin (2002) describe 
systems-of-systems as systems with emergent behavior that are operationally independent, 
managerially independent, evolutionarily developed, and geographically distributed.  
Boardman and Sauser (2006) describe one of the differentiating characteristics of an SoS 
as autonomy exercised by the constituent systems in order to fulfill the purpose of the SoS. 
Other definitions include operational and managerial independence and geographical 
separations of the constituent systems. Two characteristics of the types of systems-of-
systems normally considered in the US Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition are that 
the constituent systems of an SoS are not chosen, but rather mandated to belong to the 
SoS and that the SoSs are usually bounded.  An SoS can consist of to-be-developed 
systems, existing systems, or some combinations of new and existing systems.  
SoS acquisition in the US DoD is faced with many challenges.  Some SoS programs 
have faced technical and management challenges, if not failures. The US Army’s Future 
Combat System program (US Army, 2002) has a serious budget overrun (GAO, 2002; 
2007).  The US Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater System suffers from the lack of 
collaboration between contractors and the system integrators’ inability to impose decisions 
on them (GAO, 2006).    
With an aim to develop approaches that can prevent such SoS acquisition programs 
from failing,  Ghose and DeLaurentis (2008) look into “types of acquisition management, 
policy insights, and approaches that can increase the success of an acquisition in the SoS 
setting.”  They investigate the impact of SoS attributes, such as “requirement 
interdependency, project risk, and span-of-control of SoS managers and engineers—on the 
completion time of SoS projects.”  Ghose and DeLaurentis (2008; 2009) cite the following: 
the common causes of failure (Rouse 2007) within SoS acquisition processes as: a) 
misalignment of objectives among the systems, b) limited span of control of the SoS 
engineer on the component systems of the SoS, c) evolution of the SoS, d) 






dependencies within systems, f) perceived complexity of systems and g) the 
challenges in system representation. 
In their work, they analyze the effect of requirement dependency, span-of-control and 
risk profiles on, as a success metric, the total time to complete the project.  For example, 
they find that acquisition process completes in 19 time-steps with low span-of-control, as 
compared to 12 time-steps with high span-of-control.  The concept of span-of-control of 
engineers and managers is also addressed in the work in this paper, as it is related to both 
the pre-acquisition and acquisition phases of SoS acquisition.  
Osmundson et al. (2007) address SoS acquisition issues and their resolution by 
modeling simulation, but with a focus on SoS systems engineering.  These issues include 
initial agreement to operate as an SoS, SoS control, organization of the SoS, identifying 
SoS measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measuring effectiveness, staffing, team building 
and training for SoS operation, identifying data requirements, identifying and managing 
interfaces, risk management, SoS testing and managing emergent behavior.  Each of these 
issues is briefly discussed here.   A detailed elaboration of these issues and their resolution 
by modeling and simulation are in (Osmundson et al., 2008). 
The work captured in this paper attempts to answer this question: Can new 
contracting concepts be developed to aid in maximizing the probability of SoS acquisition 
success?  The usual systems acquisition success criteria apply: performance, schedule, and 
budget—systems to be developed within a desired schedule and within a budget and to 
perform according to requirements.  Briefly, contracting refers to the federal government and 
DoD contract management policy and guidance, roles and responsibilities in DoD contract 
management.  A detailed elaboration of these contracting elements can be found in 
(Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
This paper treats a realistic scenario of an SoS acquisition program represented in 
Figures 1 and 2.  It is realistic in the sense that it reflects some current DoD SoS acquisition 
programs.  Figure 1 shows three separate, autonomous, individual systems (System A, 
System B, and System C).  These systems are currently being acquired (researched, 
developed, tested, produced, and deployed).  Each system is managed by a government 
program office and a contractor performing in accordance with the requirements of an 
acquisition contract.  In this scenario, during the course of the acquisition of each individual 
system, a new mission arises and requires an SoS that consists of the three systems to be 
built; the government thus adds a requirement that each individual system become part of 
the SoS acquisition program.  Figure 2 reflects the new SoS acquisition program.  In this 
paper, the discussion of the contracting structures and processes for SoS acquisition 
pertains to this scenario. 
 







Figure 2. Addition of SoS Requirements 
The transition from the acquisition of individual systems to the acquisition of an SoS 
has implications on the relationship between the government and the contractors.  This 
relationship is also determined by the organizational structure used to manage the SoS 
acquisition program.   Will the required SoS systems engineering be performed by a new, 
overarching group, by a collaboration among systems engineering organizations associated 
with existing systems, or by a single systems engineering organization associated with one 
of the component SoS systems?  In addition to contracting, organizational structure is also 
discussed in this paper.   
The goals of this paper are as follows: 
1. To emphasize the span-of-control of engineers on SoS acquisition during the 
SoS pre-acquisition and acquisition phases, 
1. To examine all possible contracting options in conjunction with all possible 
organizing options, 
2. To arrive at the possible combinations of contracting and organizing options 
for resolving the SoS acquisition issues, and 
3. To map resolution of SoS issues to the SoS acquisition success criteria. 
The rest of the paper begins with a discussion of the SoS acquisition issues, follows 
with an examination of some SoS-acquisition-related concepts, and ends with a conclusion. 
Recent System-of-Systems Acquisitions 
Examples of recent SoS acquisitions are the US Army’s Future Combat System, the 
US Coast Guard’s Deepwater System, the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and 
Homeland Security’s SBInet, each of which has experienced technical, budget, and 
schedule challenges beyond what is considered the usual norm for single system 
acquisitions. 
Future Combat System. The Future Combat System (FCS), shown in Figure 3, 
was originally to be composed of a networked system of new manned ground vehicles 
(shown on the right-hand side of Figure 3) and unmanned aerial vehicles (shown on the left 
side of Figure 3).  FCS has recently been scaled back to a networked system of unmanned 







Figure 3. Original US Army Future Combat System Architecture 
The initial program cost estimate was $91.4 billion and the first combat brigade 
equipped with FCS was expected to roll out around 2015, followed by full production to 
equip up to 15 brigades by 2030 (Feickert & Lucas, 2009). 
Deepwater.  Deepwater, shown in Figure 4, originally was to include updated 
legacy ships plus new national security cutters, offshore patrol cutters and fast response 
cutters; updated aircraft and new manned and unmanned aircraft; and a new C4ISR system 
that would provide seamless communications between all of the assets, as show in Figure 
5. The Deepwater program was begun in 2002, estimated to cost between $19-24 billion, 
and expected to take 20-25 years to complete. The contract was awarded to Integrated 
Coast Guard Systems (ICGS), a joint venture of Northrup Grumman and Lockheed Martin, 
and ICGS hired subcontractors to design and build new assets. The Deepwater program 
was not only replacing old ships and aircraft, but was offering an integrated approach to 
upgrading other existing assets with improved C4ISR equipment and innovative logistics 







Figure 4. Original Coast Guard Deepwater Vessels and Aerial Vehicles 
 
Figure 5. Networked Deepwater System-of-systems 
The Deepwater program consisted of  updating legacy assets and building new 
classes of cutters, such as the National Security Cutter, the Offshore Patrol Cutter, and the 
Fast Response Cutter; modernizing aircraft and building a comprehensive, long-term 
aviation force, including maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and high-altitude 
endurance unmanned aerial vehicles; developing an integrated logistics support system; 
and modernizing the Coast Guard’s command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance  (C4ISR) systems to promote seamless 
communications between assets.  C4ISR is fundamental to improving maritime domain 
awareness and is designed to not only ensure seamless interoperability among all Coast 
Guard units but also with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components as well as 






Joint Tactical Radio System.  The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is a 
software defined radio (SDR) that allows a single hardware platform to be reconfigurable so 
that it can accommodate multiple radio waveforms. JTRS accommodates legacy and new 
mobile ad hoc networking waveforms and can store and run multiple waveforms (Nathans & 
Stephens, 2007).  JTRS is considered an SoS and consists of airborne-maritime fixed site 
(AMF) radios, ground mobile radios (GMR), handheld man pad small form fit radio (HMS), 
network centric enterprise services (NCES), GIG bandwidth extension (GIG-BE),  and 
legacy networks. A model of the AMF delivery process is shown in Figure 6. Lockheed 

















Figure 6. JTRS Airborne-maritime Fixed (AMF) Delivery Model 
(JTRS, 2009) 
SBInet.  SBInet is a virtual fence designed to detect illegal crossings of the US 
southern border with Mexico. The virtual fence consists of a network of cameras, radars, 
lighting and other sensors—some mounted on elevated towers, as shown in Figure7—and 
networked through a communication system that includes satellite nodes and links. The 
original contract was awarded to Boeing Integrated Defense Systems in 2006 and it was 
intended that the virtual fence would be in place, covering the entire US-Mexican border by 
2011. At the time Boeing was awarded the contract, the cost was estimated to be $2.5 
billion (Montalbano, 2010).
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Figure 7. SBInet Sensor Tower 
Each of these SoS programs has followed a similar acquisition approach: contract to 
a large system integrator (LSI) who is supposed to have the responsibility and authority to 
manage the overall effort, including those of LSI subcontractors and vendors who number in 
a range from four to 100 or more. In the Lead System Integrator model, all four main tasks 
of building weapons have passed from government to industry. The LSI sets functional 
requirements and system specifications, provides program technical direction, controls 
program management, and controls program technical execution. The key reasons behind 
this shift are the growing complexity and scope of such systems while organic acquisition, 
systems engineering, program management resources within government are getting 
scarcer. 
All of the example SoSs have experienced major challenges: two programs have 
been restructured with the customer organization taking over the LSI role from the private 
sector contractor; one program is in hiatus awaiting further investigation; and the fourth 
program faces almost certain large cost and schedule overruns. 
FCS. There have been significant adjustments to the FCS program since its 
development start in 2003. The program was restructured and 4 of 18 core systems were 
cancelled. After the first four years of development, the Army estimated a total acquisition 
cost growth from $91.4 billion to $160.9 billion, while independent estimates were 
considerably higher—$203.3 billion and $233.9 billion.   The program started with immature 
technologies and only 2 of the program’s 44 technologies were fully matured by late 2006, 
according to the GAO, and it warned that all critical technologies may not be fully mature 
until the Army‘s production decision in February 2013. Requirements for networks and 
software were late, poorly defined or omitted due to the accelerated schedule for FCS 
development (Francis, 2008). 
Deepwater. As an earlier part of the Deepwater program, the Coast Guard initiated 
an effort to modernize its existing 110-foot Island class patrol boats so that they could 
remain in service pending the delivery of replacement Deepwater craft. Among other things, 
the modernization increased the length of the boats to 123 feet. The effort is thus referred to 
variously as the 110-foot modernization program, the 123-foot modernization program, or 
the 110/123-foot modernization program. The initial eight boats in the program began to 






Coast Guard removed the boats from service and canceled the program, having spent close 
to $100 million on it. There were serious problems in the C4ISR system. 
The Coast Guard is now pursuing Deepwater acquisition programs as individual 
programs, rather than as elements of a single, integrated program. The Coast Guard states 
that it is still using a systems approach to optimizing its acquisition programs, including the 
Deepwater acquisition programs, but that the system being optimized is now the Coast 
Guard as a whole, as opposed to the Deepwater subset of programs. 
The Coast Guard announced in April 2007 that it would assume the lead role as 
systems integrator for all Coast Guard Deepwater assets. The Coast Guard is phasing out 
its reliance on ICGS as a LSI for Deepwater acquisition and will terminate the contract with 
ICGS in January 2011.  To support its shift to that of the systems integrator, the Coast 
Guard is increasing its in-house system-integration capabilities. 
JTRS.  Since its initiation in 1997 until restructuring in 2006, the JTRS program 
experienced cost and schedule overruns and performance shortfalls, due primarily to 
immature technologies, unstable requirements, and aggressive schedules (GAO, 2006). 
More recently, the JTRS held a stakeholders review in December 2009, after several 
postponements of a scheduled CDR. Some of the recently identified issues are as follows: 
the current baseline relies on airborne platform processors to perform many of management 
functions, and while the platform processor will perform rudimentary radio control functions 
necessary to meeting the platform mission, relying on the platform processor for performing 
network management functions is unacceptable; JTRS is having some difficulty meeting 
NSA information assurance requirements; there have been a large number of requirements 
allocated by the LSI from upper levels to lower levels and not accepted by subcontractors at 
the lower levels; there is concern that some waveforms are not ready to be ported to JTRS; 
the current Platform Integration Kit (PIK) design doesn’t integrate onto some platforms and 
some platforms do not want to use a PIK at all; and the software design and architecture is 
not fully defined and the definition would need to  include operationally relevant system 
threads that demonstrate end-to-end capability. The JTRS program has extended its 
schedule and will also likely cost significantly more than current budget estimates.  
SBInet. A GAO report on SBInet released in March 2010 identified a flawed testing 
process, performance issues, and poor management as serious ongoing issues affecting 
the program. The Department of Homeland Security cut off funding for the program, pending 
further review. Test plans were poorly defined and plagued by "numerous and extensive 
last-minute changes to test procedures," according to the GAO report, and even when the 
system was tested, it performed poorly.  Further, those overseeing the project failed to 
prioritize solving problems with the system and failed to conduct further tests. The report 
concluded that if the development and testing of the system were to continue in the same 
fashion, SBInet would not perform as expected and would take longer and cost more than 
necessary to implement.  
The DHS had expected the entire SBInet project to cost $6.7 billion, a readjustment 
from its original projected budget of $8 billion. To date, the DHS has spent about $720 
million on current SBInet deployments since the project began in 2005. The project was 
originally scheduled for completion by 2014, but the technical glitches and delays outlined in 
the GAO report held up the project so that only a prototype of the final solution is currently in 
use on just one part of the border. Funding for the SBInet has recently been suspended, 






Systems-of-Systems Acquisition Issues 
Systems acquisition refers to the disciplined management approach for the 
acquisition of an individual system, such as a weapon system (aircraft, ship, missile, etc.) or 
an information technology system.  The acquisition process involves the various activities 
related to the development, design, integration, testing, production, deployment, operations 
and support, and disposal of the system.  Within the federal government, specifically the 
DoD, systems acquisition uses a program management approach to the management of 
these activities.  This approach involves the use of a project lifecycle, which includes 
phases, gates, and decision-points, a project manager, and a project team (Rendon & 
Snider, 2008).   This approach is envisioned to apply to SoS acquisition, but making use of 
some new concepts, discussed in this paper, as there are significant differences between 
systems and systems-of-systems (SoS) and these differences affect the nature of 
government contracting for the development of systems-of-systems.  Such application 
requires understanding of the issues associated with SoS acquisition. 
The aforementioned SoS acquisition issues raised in Osmundson et al. (2008) are 
now briefly discussed here.   In this paper, the importance of SE endeavor ties to the SoS 
pre-acquisition and acquisition phases and to the contracting process is emphasized; that is, 
the span of control of the engineers is crucial in these SoS pre-acquisition and acquisition 
phases. 
• Initial agreement refers to decision-makers initially getting agreement that an 
SoS meets some desirable objective. It is an issue in particular when the SoS 
involves systems from different organizations or services because 
establishing an initial agreement is contingent on quantifying the benefits and 
risks of the new SoS.  
• SoS control must be established: Who will control the SoS and how it will be 
controlled. Each partner may lose some measure of control over its own 
systems in order to enable overall SoS control. 
• Organizing is a key issue of how to organize for the development and 
operation of an SoS. An example is the systems engineering process: How 
are processes that interface with SoS processes established and monitored?  
• Staffing, team building, and training refer to how an SoS will be staffed and 
operated. SoS operations must be planned for, the skills required for SoS 
operations identified, and personnel with the proper skills acquired and 
trained in SoS operations. 
• Data requirements is an issue concerning sharing of classified and/or 
proprietary design information among the SoS partners, who must recognize 
and weigh a possible loss of their systems’ operational superiority based on 
the shared classified or proprietary design information against the SoS 
benefits. 
• Interfaces must be identified and managed. Common language, grammar 
and usage must be established (for information SoSs), configuration 
management invoked to assure common agreements are followed, and 
required information security levels identified and provisions made to assure 






• Risk management at the SoS level is an issue related to the mitigation of SoS 
risks potentially effected by component systems, which requires detailed 
knowledge of component system risks and variations in individual system 
outputs. 
• SoS testing requires that each SoS partner’s system be tested in a manner 
that resolves any of its concerns about operational behavior and that SoS 
threads be tested. 
• Measures of effectiveness is an issue because their strong dependence on 
individual component systems’ measures of performance requires an 
understanding of the latter, and this issue is related to the issues of data 
requirements and interfaces. 
• Emergent behavior, exhibited by the SoS resulting from unknown interactions 
among the constituent systems or from its interaction with the environment, 
need to be collectively understood, analyzed, and resolved, in particular when 
an emergent behavior may be detrimental to one or more of the partners. 
Some SoS-acquisition-related Concepts 
What contracting and organizing options can be used to aid in resolving the SoS 
issues?  This section discusses these options and the correspondence of their combinations 
and the SoS issues. 
Cross-functional Team Model. As previously stated, government systems 
acquisition management involves the use of project teams.  The project team is a cross-
functional team, consisting of technical specialists from the various functional areas involved 
in the acquisition process.  These functional areas typically include systems engineering, 
contract management, financial management, logistics, and others.  The cross-functional 
team is led by the government program manager.  The program manager has overall 
responsibility for the success of the acquisition project.  Although the program manager has 
overall responsibility, the program manager may not have all of the authority needed to 
manage the program.  For example, the contracting officer may have the specific authority 
to award and make changes to the contract.  Most systems acquisition programs involve 
effort performed by a contractor with the contract managed by the government program 
office.  The contractor will generally have its own program manager and cross-functional 
team managing the contract for the contractor.  Daily communication and coordination 
between government and contractor program managers, system engineers, and contract 
managers is the norm in defense acquisition management (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  This 
paper is focused on systems engineering and contract management of the cross-functional 
team.   
SoS Systems Engineering. In order to support knowledge-based acquisition, 
there is a need for effective global SoS systems engineering before the start of the 
acquisition process. Prior to milestone A, and prior to the Material Solution Analysis phase 
that cumulates in milestone A, an assessment must be made of technology opportunities 
and resources as well as of user needs. Assessment of technology opportunities and 
resources requires a global understanding of the proposed SoS and its operational 
environment. A technology may be considered mature when used in an existing system, but 
may lack required maturity when the existing system is incorporated into the proposed SoS 






that is mature and stable when operating within the boundaries of a single system, but lacks 
the ability to interoperate with other systems.  
Technology maturity assessment can also be considered one aspect of risk 
assessment and in the same way that technology maturity assessment must be made in the 
global context of the SoS, so must risk assessments. 
The SoS must be represented in the pre-milestone A phase clearly, and in enough 
detail, to elucidate SoS technology and risk issues. A clear and complete SoS 
representation also elucidates data requirements and data ownership issues that will impact 
contractual relationships. SoS representation is a system architecting task that drives other 
early SoS systems engineering analyses and requires a very high level of skill. P.C. Lui, 
INCOSE Fellow and retired Singapore Defence Chief Scientist, remarked that while there 
are a limited number of good systems engineers, there is a very small number of systems 
architects. Yet, experienced, successful government and industry systems architects are 
essential at the start of SoS acquisitions. Good systems architecting will not assure program 
success, but lack of good systems architecting will almost always result in program failure. 
One systems architecting approach is to represent SoSs in an object-oriented 
manner, using Systems Modeling Language (SysML), for example Huynh and Osmundson 
(2007) and Osmundson et al. (2004). Since SoSs can be represented in an object oriented 
modeling language, testing SoSs can be considered to be similar to integration testing of 
object-oriented software systems (Binder, 2000). System A is tested first and then a System 
B that interacts with System A is integrated with A and the combination is tested; then, a 
System C that interacts with A is integrated with A and tested; then, if Systems B and C 
interact together, B and C are integrated and tested, and then A, B and C are integrated and 
tested. These integration tests are based on thread of operations analysis, a part of the front 
end systems architecting process. 
Knowledge of the availability of all systems is required early in the acquisition 
process in order to develop accurate test plans and program schedules. If a system is 
unavailable for testing, then a stub or driver is required; stub and driver development require 
complete knowledge about the missing system.  
Thus, prior to milestone A and during the technology opportunities and resources 
assessment, there must be an SoS systems engineering team in place that has the high-
level skills necessary to develop accurate SoS architectural representations, conduct 
technology assessments and risk assessments.  High-level systems engineering expertise  
and systems engineering activities are necessary in order to assure knowledge-based 
acquisition. Without them, the SoS acquisition would begin with incomplete and possibly 
inaccurate technology maturity knowledge and risk knowledge. 
The concept of span of control on the system components is crucial in all phases of 
acquisition.  This means that systems engineering discipline need be enhanced and ever 
present in the SoS pre-acquisition and acquisition phases.  Toward this end, there are two 
possible approaches. One is having a capable SE organization strictly organic to the SoS 
acquisition program office, and the other is using a capable SE organization external to the 
SoS acquisition program office, but the latter has strict ownership of the SE organization 
during the entire SoS acquisition.  The advantages of the first approach are that the span of 
control of the engineers takes hold, direct control or exchanges are facilitated, and 
independence from contractors’ undue influence materializes.  The disadvantages are 






budgets for the same service required of the former, and time spent on establishing 
contracts to have an external organization to support. 
Whereas this concept is not new, this paper calls for it to be instituted and for the 
span of control to exist during the pre-acquisition and acquisition phases. 
 
Contracting Options.  The transition from the acquisition of individual systems to 
the acquisition of an SoS has implications on the relationship between the government and 
the contractors.  This relationship is largely determined by the contracting structure and 
processes governing the SoS requirements.  There are three options for incorporating the 
SoS requirements into the individual acquisition programs (Programs A, B, and C in the 
scenario): two separate contracts, replacement of the existing contract, and modification of 
the existing contract.  The discussion of each of them follows. 
The first option is to incorporate the SoS requirements (shaded areas of each system 
in Figure 2) as a contract distinct from the existing contract for each contractor.  Contractors 
A, B, and C would receive an additional contract with the specific SoS requirements for that 
specific system.  In this option, each contractor would be working under two different and 
separate contracts—one for the acquisition of the basic system, and one for the SoS 
requirements related to the basic system. 
The second option is to terminate the original contract for the acquisition of the 
individual system and to negotiate and award a new single contract for both the acquisition 
of the single system and the acquisition of the SoS components of that system.  In this 
option, each contractor remains with only one contract.  
The third option is to negotiate a modification to the existing contract, which 
incorporates the SoS requirements for that system under the existing contract.  In this 
option, the contractor also remains with a single contract, albeit a modified contract, for all 
acquisition requirements. 
This paper suggests that the third contracting option, modifying the existing contract 
to incorporate the SoS requirements, would be preferred over the first option, since having a 
contractor work under two separate contracts may be problematic.  For example, there is a 
risk that the two contracts may be in conflict with each other, such as conflicting 
specifications, statements of work, or schedule priorities.  The resources required for 
administering two separate contracts would be a disadvantage.  Furthermore, managing two 
separate contracts would complicate organizational structures (discussed below).  The third 
option would be preferred over the second option because modifying an existing contract is 
more advantageous than negotiating a termination agreement on the original contract and 
then negotiating a new contract with the contractor.  During these negotiations, it is likely 
that the contractor would need to stop the acquisition effort, thus impacting the project 
schedule and cost. 
Organizational Structure Options.  Different SoS acquisition contracting options 
bear some impact on SoS acquisition program organizational structures.  As previously 
stated, the transition from the acquisition of individual systems to the acquisition of an SoS 
has implications on the relationship between the government and the contractors.  This 
relationship is also determined by the organizational structure used to manage the SoS 






In structuring the organization, three options can be used for the SoS acquisition 
program.  The first option is to designate one of the individual programs as the lead program 
and make that government program office responsible for managing the entire SoS 
acquisition program, which includes the other two systems.  For example, the government 
program office managing System A could be designated the lead program and made 
responsible for ensuring systems (A, B, and C) meet the SoS requirements.  Thus, the 
government program manager for System A will also have SoS acquisition responsibility and 
authority over the government program managers for System B and System C. 
The second option is to establish a separate government program office responsible 
for the SoS acquisition program.  This separate government program office would have SoS 
acquisition responsibility and authority over the three individual government program offices 
managing their individual acquisition programs (System A, System, B, and System C.)  In 
this option, the SoS acquisition management would be performed by in-house government 
acquisition and contracting workforce.  
In the third option, a contractor is selected to manage the acquisition of the SoS 
program.  This contractor, typically referred to as a Lead Systems Integrator, would oversee 
the SoS requirements within the three individual systems (A, B, and C). This option entails 
awarding a contract to a company to perform the SoS acquisition management. 
This paper suggests that the second organizing option, establishing a separate 
government program office responsible for the SoS acquisition program, would be preferred 
over the first organizing option, since having one of the individual programs as the lead 
program and making that government program office responsible for managing the entire 
SoS acquisition program would result in potential conflicts of interest.  The government 
program manager for the individual program may be biased and improperly influenced in the 
management of the overall SoS acquisition program.  In this position, the government 
program manager may favor the individual program over the needs of the SoS.  
The second organizing option would be preferred over the third organizing option 
because having a contractor manage the SoS acquisition program may involve the 
contractor performing some of the critical requirements determination and acquisition 
decision-making of the SoS program.  The third contracting option may result in the out-
sourcing of inherently government functions related to the acquisition of the SoS program.  It 
may also result in the government’s loss of a systems engineering core competency and 
capability for managing SoS programs.  
Integrating Acquisition Management Processes.  In addition to the contracting 
options discussed above, another SoS issue relates to the integration of the SoS contract 
requirements among individual contracts.  SoS acquisition programs involve a high level of 
uncertainty, and thus, a high level of risk.  Since many of the individual systems have 
evolving requirements, and these requirements are required to interface with other individual 
systems in the SoS, the level of integration needed in the acquisition process of each 
individual system, as well as the SoS, is very high.  Additionally, in SoS acquisition 
programs, the use of Lead Systems Integrators (LSIs) or prime systems contractors 
overseeing subcontractors performing the majority of the acquisition effort, also adds to the 
high need of integration within the acquisition process.  In these SoS acquisition programs, 
one of the critical challenges is integrating the cost, schedule, and performance elements 
within the individual contracts (which now include the SoS requirements). 
Many agencies respond to the increased uncertainty and risk of systems-of-systems 






performance requirements, contract type, incentive, delivery schedule, and other terms and 
conditions.  Other agencies attempt to increase the flexibility of the contract elements to 
reflect the high uncertainty and risk.  This flexibility would be reflected not in the detailed 
product or performance specifications of the contract, but more in the processes established 
for development of the specifications, testing and acceptance criteria, and cost allowability 
(Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke, 2008).  A preferred approach is to strike a proper balance 
between contract element specificity and flexibility.  This can be done through the 
development of an integrated management system, which will be discussed next. 
In integrating the major elements of the SoS acquisition cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives, a best practice is to establish an integrated management system 
that integrates the planning, monitoring and control, and feedback elements of the SoS 
acquisition program.  
The planning elements include the requirement specification, work breakdown 
structure, statement of work, and the integrated master plan.  The integrated master plan 
(IMP) reflects all program activity, expands on the statement of work tasks, and defines the 
milestones.  The IMP also specifies the program events, significant accomplishments, 
accomplishment criteria, and detailed tasks.  The IMP is incorporated in the contract, along 
with the specifications, WBS, and SOW.  However, it should be noted that the IMP is an 
event-driven plan and does not specify any calendar schedule.   The JTRS AMF contract 
includes an IMP along with a Statement of Objectives, WBS, Performance Requirements 
Document, and other specifications. 
The monitoring and control elements include the integrated master schedule (IMS), 
technical performance measures, and the earned value management system.  Although not 
part of the contract, the integrated master schedule provides the detailed calendar schedule 
for tracking schedule progress; the earned value management systems tracks cost and 
schedule performance; and the technical performance measurement system tracks the 
technical risk.  The JTRS AMF program includes an IMS as well as technical performance 
measures and an earned value management system. 
The feedback elements include the contract award fee, if any, and contractor 
performance assessment reviews.  The contract award fee allows the contractor to earn 
additional profit, based on over and above required levels of performance.  The contractor’s 
performance and any award fee decisions are based on a subjective evaluation of the 
government.  The contractor performance assessment review is separate from the award 
fee and applies to all government contracts exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold.  
The JTRS AMF contract includes an award fee for the design, development, delivery, and 
testing of the Engineering Development Models. 
This integrated management system would be developed and used for each 
individual system acquisition program, as well as developed and used at the SoS level by 
the government program office responsible for the SoS acquisition program, as discussed in 
the previous organizational structure options.   
Linkages between Contracting Options and Organizational Structure 
Options.  A logical linkage appears to exist between the preferred contracting and 
organizing options for transitioning from the acquisition of individual systems to the 
acquisition of an SoS.  The preferred contracting option of modifying the existing contracts 
to incorporate the SoS requirements and the preferred organizing option of establishing a 
separate government program office responsible for the SoS acquisition program can be 






acquisition of the SoS would be the requirements agency for the SoS program.  In this 
capacity, the SoS government program office could communicate the SoS requirements to 
each system program office.  The system program office would then incorporate these 
requirements into the individual system contract modification.  The systems engineering and 
contract management personnel from the SoS government program office would 
communicate and collaborate with the systems engineering and contract management 
personnel in each of the individual system program offices to manage these SoS 
requirements. 
One potential drawback to the linkage of the two preferred contracting and 
organizing options would be the conflict potential between the SoS government program 
manager and the individual system government program manager (such as between the 
SoS government program manager and System A government program manager).  This 
would occur in situations dealing with cost, schedule, and performance priorities between 
the two aspects of the system (individual and SoS). The understanding of and adherence to 
roles and responsibilities between the SoS government program manager and the individual 
system program manager, as well as an order of precedence clause in the contract, would 
help deter these potential conflict situations.  
Table 1 shows a number of possible combinations of contracting and organizing 
options, which  (marked with “√”) potentially result in the resolution of the SoS issues, which, 
in turn, enable satisfaction of  the SoS acquisition success criteria (marked with “X”).  As 
discussed above, the preferred contracting option for the scenario of interest is the 
replacement of the existing contract.  It can be combined with either the separate 
government program option, which is, as discussed above, the preferred option or the lead 
systems integrator option.  For example, given that the existing contract is replaced by a 
new one, either the separate government program option or the lead systems integrator 
option, the SoS interfaces issue should be resolved.  The resolution of such an issue would 
enable the satisfaction of the SoS acquisition criteria.  
Table 1. Resolution of SoS Issues by Option Combinations and Satisfaction of 



















Initial agreement . √ √ √ X
SoS control √ √ X
Organizing √ √ √ X X X
Staffing, team building, and training √ √ X
Data requirements √ √ X X
Interfaces √ √ √ X X X
Risk management √ √ √ X X X
SoS testing √ √ √ X X X
Measures of effectiveness √ √ √ X X X
Emergent behavior √ √ √ X
Acquisition Success CriteriaContracting Option Organizing Option
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this on-going research is to determine contracting and organizational 
options to enable successful SoS acquisition and to apply them to current and future DoD 
SoS acquisitions.  






• A sustainable systems engineering effort with an extensive span of control by 
systems engineers within an SoS acquisition is necessary for a successful 
SoS acquisition 
• Among the possible contracting options, replacing the contract is the 
preferred option.  But that’s not sufficient.  Organizing options must be 
considered, for an organizing option must be  coupled directly with a 
contracting option and, together, they would enable resolution of the SoS 
acquisition issues, which, in turn, could improve the probability of SoS 
acquisition success, thereby facilitating and effectively managing the SoS 
acquisition effort. 
These findings will be applied to a case study, whose results will be published in a 
future paper.  Furthermore, a separate paper will invoke a collaboration theory and 
incorporate it in the organizing options in particular and in SoS acquisition in general (Huynh 
et al., 2010). 
References 
Binder, R. (2000). Testing object-oriented systems: Models, patterns, and tools. Addison-
Wesley. 
Boardman, J., & Sauser, B. (2006, April 24-26). The meaning of system of systems. In 
Proceedings of the IEEE International System of Systems Conference. Los Angeles, 
CA. 
Brown, T.L., Potoski, M., & Van Slyke, D.M. (2008). The challenge of contracting for large 
complex projects: A case study of the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program. 
Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government. 
Chen, P., & Clothier, J. (2003). Advancing systems engineering for systems-of-systems 
challenges. Systems Engineering, 6(3), 170-183. 
Chuen, L.P. (2007, March). Chief Defence Scientist, Ministry of Defence, Singapore. 
[Personal communication]. 
Feickert, A., & Lucas, N.J. (2009, November 30). Army future combat system (FCS) “spin-
outs” and ground combat vehicle (GCV): Background and issues for Congress. 
Congressional Research Service Report to Congress (7-5700 RL32888). 
Washington, DC: US GPO. 
Francis, P.L. (2008, April 10). 2009 review of future combat system is critical to program's 
direction (GAO-08-638T). Washington, DC: US GPO.  
GAO. (2002, July 1). Issues facing the Army’s future combat systems. Retrieved July 1, 
2002, from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031010r.pdf 
GAO. (2006, June). Coast Guard: Observations on agency performance, operations and 
future challenges. Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06448t.pdf 
GAO. (2006, September). Restructured JTRS program reduces risk, but significant 
challenges remain (GAO-06-955). Report to Congressional Committees. 
Washington, DC: Author. 
GAO. (2007, January 2). Future combat system risks underscore the importance of 
oversight. Retrieved January 2, 2007, from 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07672t.pdf 
Ghose, S., & DeLaurentis, D.A. (2008, May 14-15). Defense acquisition management of 
systems-of-systems. In Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Acquisition Research 






Ghose, S., & DeLaurentis, D.A. (2009, July). Development of an exploratory computer 
model for acquisition management of system-of-systems. In Proceedings of the 
INCOSE Symposium. Singapore. 
Huynh, T.V., & Osmundson, J.S. (2007, March 23-24). An integrated systems engineering 
methodology for analyzing systems of systems architectures. In Proceedings of the 
1st Asia-Pacific Systems Engineering Conference. Singapore. 
Huynh, T.V., Osmundson, J.S., & Rendon, R.G. (2010, forthcoming). On collaboration in 
systems-of-systems acquisition.  
JTRS. (2009, December 2-3). Stakeholder review. San Diego, CA. 
Maier, M., & Rechtin, E.I. (2002). The art of systems architecting. Boca Raton, FL: CRC 
Press. 
Montalbano, E. (2010, March 19). GAO: Multiple failures sunk border security system. 
Information Week.  
Nathans, D., & Stephens, D.R. (2007, July). Reconfiguring to meet demands: Software-
defined radio. Crosstalk Magazine. 
O'Rourke, R. (2009, December 23). Coast Guard Deepwater Acquisition Programs: 
Background, oversight issues, and options for Congress. Congressional Research 
Service Report for Congress (7-5700 RL33753). Washington, DC: US GPO. 
Osmundson, J.S., Gottfried, R., Kum, C.Y., Boon, L.H., Lian, L.W., Patrick, P.S.W., & Thye, 
T.C. (2004). Process modeling: A systems engineering tool for analyzing complex 
systems. Systems Engineering, 7(4). 
Osmundson, J.S., Langford, G.O., & Huynh, T.V. (2007, March 23-24). System of systems 
management issues. In Proceedings of the Asia Pacific Systems Engineering 
Conference (APSEC). Singapore. 
Rendon, R.G., & Snider, K.F. (Eds.). (2008). Management of defense acquisition projects.  
AIAA, Library of Flight Series, Reston, VA. 
Sage, A.P., & Cuppan, C.D. (2001). On the systems engineering and management of 
systems-of systems and federations of systems, information, knowledge. Systems 
Management, 2(4), 325-345. 






2003 - 2010 Sponsored Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
 Defense Industry Consolidation 
 EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to Shipyard 
Planning Processes  
 Managing the Services Supply Chain 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 Private Military Sector 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Spiral Development 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository 
Contract Management 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Contracting Government Procurement Functions 
 Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting, Planning and Execution 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 Strategic Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 USAF Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 
 USMC Contingency Contracting 
Financial Management 
 Acquisitions via Leasing: MPS case 
 Budget Scoring 






 Capital Budgeting for the DoD 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 Lessons from Private Sector Capital Budgeting for DoD Acquisition Budgeting 
Reform 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Improve Cost Estimates 
Human Resources 
 Indefinite Reenlistment 
 Individual Augmentation 
 Learning Management Systems 
 Moral Conduct Waivers and First-tem Attrition 
 Retention 
 The Navy’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Management System 
 Tuition Assistance 
Logistics Management 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Army LOG MOD 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Cold-chain Logistics 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Evolutionary Acquisition 
 Lean Six Sigma to Reduce Costs and Improve Readiness 
 Naval Aviation Maintenance and Process Improvement (2) 
 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
 Outsourcing the Pearl Harbor MK-48 Intermediate Maintenance Activity  
 Pallet Management System 
 PBL (4) 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 






 Risk Analysis for Performance-based Logistics 
 R-TOC AEGIS Microwave Power Tubes 
 Sense-and-Respond Logistics Network 
 Strategic Sourcing 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module Acquisition 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 Contractor vs. Organic Support 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to AEGIS and SSDS 
 Managing the Service Supply Chain 
 Measuring Uncertainty in Earned Value 
 Organizational Modeling and Simulation 
 Public-Private Partnership 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Utilizing Collaborative and Three-dimensional Imaging Technology 
 
A complete listing and electronic copies of published research are available on our website: 
































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 
 
 
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=êÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=çÑ=ÄìëáåÉëë=C=éìÄäáÅ=éçäáÅó=
k~î~ä=éçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=
RRR=avbo=ol^aI=fkdboplii=e^ii=
jlkqbobvI=`^ifclokf^=VPVQP=
www.acquisitionresearch.org 
